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ANALYZING MALAYSIA’S CHANGING ALIGNMENT CHOICES, 1971-89 
This article analyzes Malaysia’s changing policies toward China and other 
big powers during the period 1971-1989, as a case to illustrate how and why 
smaller states adjust their alignment choices in the wake of reduced strategic 
commitment of their big power patrons the way they do. It argues that it was 
due to the changing distribution of regional power in the face of the British 
East of Suez policy and the American retreat from mainland Southeast Asia in 
the late 1960s – in conjunction with domestic political considerations in the 
post-1969 period – that had compelled Malaysia’s ruling elite to replace the 
country’s long-standing pro-West policy with a new posture of “non-
alignment” and “regional neutralization”. In the view of the elite, in order to 
get the big powers to recognize and guarantee the region as an area of 
neutrality, the Southeast Asian states should acknowledge and accommodate 
each of the major powers’ “legitimate interests”, while observing a policy of 
“equidistance” with all the powers. This new alignment posture necessitated 
the Tun Razak government to adjust its China policy, paving way for the 
Malaysia-China rapprochement of the early 1970s. 
Keywords: Smaller states, great powers, alignment choice, Malaysia’s foreign policy, 
regional neutralization, Malaysia-China relations   
 
Introduction 
This article discusses Malaysia‟s changing policies toward China and other big 
powers during the period 1971-1989, as a case to illustrate smaller states‟ changing 
alignment choices in responding to the reduced strategic commitment of their big 
power patrons. By “alignment choice”, I mean a state’s decision to configure (and 
reconfigure) its overall relations with a big power, as compelled by the ever-shifting 
distribution of power and interests in the international system, for the purpose of 
maximizing one’s own security, prosperity, and/or autonomy.1 By this definition, 
alignment choices encompasses not only alliance formation, but also all forms of 
interstate configuration that includes diplomatic rapprochement, political 
reconciliation, economic collaboration, functional coordination, and foreign policy 
partnership. 
The article first focuses on Malaysia‟s evolving alignment choices during the 
period 1971-1975, and then moves on to cover the period 1976-1989. For comparison 
purposes, the cases of other ASEAN countries will be brought into the discussion 
                                                 
1
 On “alignment choice”, see K.J. Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the 
Postwar World (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982); Glenn H. Synder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1997). Holsti‟s study is concerned with how and why governments decide to 
“reorient” their foreign policy. He uses “foreign policy realignment”, “foreign policy restructuring”, 
and “foreign policy reorientation” interchangeably, by which he refers to “a type of foreign policy 
behavior where governments seek to change, usually simultaneously, the total pattern of their external 
relations” (p. 2) – i.e. “the patterns of externally directed diplomatic, cultural, commercial and military 
relations” (p. 12). 
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wherever relevant and necessary. The central argument of this article is that, it was 
due to the changing distribution of regional power in the wake of the British East of 
Suez policy and the American retreat from mainland Southeast Asia in the late 1960s 
– in conjunction with domestic political considerations in the post-1969 period – that 
had compelled Malaysia‟s ruling elite to replace the country‟s long-standing pro-West 
policy with a new posture of “non-alignment” and “regional neutralization.” This 
posture necessitated the Tun Razak government to adjust its China policy, paving way 
for the Malaysia-China rapprochement of the early 1970s. 
 
 
Phase I (1971-1975): 
 
Rapprochement with China in the Face of Reduced Western Commitment 
This period was characterized by three major features: (a) a reduced strategic 
presence of the Western powers in the region following the British withdrawal from 
the east of Suez and the American disengagement from Indochina; (b) the growing 
salience of China as a third factor in the regional configurations of power in the wake 
of the growing Sino-Soviet split, U.S.-China détente, and the PRC‟s admission to the 
UN; and (c) the regional states‟ moves to reconcile with Beijing. As will be discussed 
below, while the third was largely a function of the first two developments, it was 
domestic factors that determined the extent and manner in which Malaysia (and for 
that matter, other smaller states in the region) had sought rapprochement with their 
giant neighbor.    
 In 1971, the British began the withdrawal of forces from its bases in Singapore 
and Malaysia. The Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) was replaced by the 
Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. The FPDA obligated all partner states to “consult” each 
other in the event of external aggression against Malaysia and Singapore; there was, 
however, no obligation for the partners to act.
2
 At around the same time, the U.S. also 
started to reduce its ground troops in mainland Southeast Asia as enunciated by 
President Nixon‟s Guam Doctrine in July 1969.  
These two events were watershed moments for Malaysia‟s defense planners. 
They effectively deprived the smaller state of the security umbrella of its big power 
patrons, and convinced the leaders that they could no longer find security in the 
protective arms of their Western allies as in the past. This realization compelled them 
to stress more on self-reliance and regionalism in their security planning.
3
  
 These developments took place amid the new importance of China as a 
                                                 
2
 Under the FPDA, a permanent Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) was set up in 1971, with 
headquarters at the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Butterworth (located in the Malaysian state of 
Penang). The IADS, which is staffed by personnel from each of the five partners, functions as the 
standing operational arm of the FPDA. Each year, it organizes several joint air exercises involving 
Malaysian and Singaporean forces as well as annual air and naval maneuvers involving some or all of 
the five partners. See Yap Pak Choy, Air Power Development: The Royal Malaysian Air Force 
Experience (Fairbairn, Australia and Bangi, Malaysia: Air Power Studies Centre and Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1997); Abdul Razak Abdul Aziz, Peraturan Pertahanan Lima Kuasa: Sikap 
Malaysia. Kertas Berkala UPSK No.2/99 (Bangi, Malaysia: Unit Pengajian Strategi dan Keselamatan, 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1999). 
3
 Muthiah Alagappa, “Malaysia: From the Commonwealth Umbrella to Self-reliance,” in Chin Kin 
Wah, ed., Defence Spending in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 1987), pp. 165-93; Lau Teik Soon, 
“ASEAN and the Future of Regionalism,” in Lau Teik Soon, ed., New Directions in the International 
Relations of Southeast Asia: The Great Powers and South East Asia (Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 1973), pp. 165-85. 
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separate centre of power in the course of growing Sino-Soviet rift and Sino-American 
rapprochement.
4
 In March 1969, the deepening Sino-Soviet tensions culminated in a 
border conflict over Zhenbao (Damansky) island. In June the same year, Brezhnev 
floated a proposal for an Asian collective security system. The proposal – coupled 
with the first appearance of a Soviet naval flotilla in the Straits of Malacca in March 
1968 – was widely viewed by leaders in the region as a sign of Moscow‟s growing 
interest in expanding its presence from the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia, in filling 
in the power vacuum, and in rallying regional support to encircle China.
5
  
It was against this backdrop that China‟s wish to break its diplomatic isolation 
and to use its improved relationship with the U.S. for counter-checking the Soviet 
threat coincided with Washington‟s desire to get China‟s support for a negotiated 
settlement in Vietnam and to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift for shoring up the American 
strategic position globally and in Asia.
6
 This convergence eventually led to the 
growing rapprochement between the U.S. and China in the early 1970s. Once a target 
of U.S. containment policy, Beijing now became a strategic partner with Washington. 
Nixon‟s announcement in February 1972 that he would visit China sent 
shockwaves around the world. The U.S.‟ allies and friends in the region were alarmed 
by the prospect of abandonment by their superpower patron, whereas the Soviets 
became concerned about the risk of encirclement by Washington and Beijing. These 
formed the structural basis for the Soviet-U.S. détente and the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between several developed countries and Beijing in the 
subsequent years. The net effect was the acceleration of the transition from bipolarity 
towards a “strategic triangle” between the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the PRC.7 
 In Southeast Asia, the ramifications of these structural changes were 
particularly pronounced and far-reaching. The U.S. plan to pursue a negotiated 
settlement and reduce its role in Indochina, in particular, was viewed by many as a 
turning point in highlighting the limits of American power.
8
 In the eyes of the smaller 
states in the region, the fact that their superpower patron was retreating from 
Indochina while moving toward a rapprochement with their principal foe plainly 
revealed the uncertain nature of great powers‟ intentions and actions. It suggested to 
the smaller actors that the U.S. was now “slowly changing the nature and the basis of 
her commitment to Southeast Asia”, from one of containing communism to that of 
safeguarding its own strategic interests by cultivating a favorable distribution of 
power in the region.
9
 In adjusting to such new realities that “the British lion no longer 
had any teeth, the Australian umbrella was leaking, and the American eagle was 
                                                 
4
 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London and New York: 
Routeldge, 1996), pp. 77-104.  
5
 Lau Teik Soon, Singapore, ASEAN and Regional Security, Occasional Paper Series No. 16 
(Singapore: Department of Political Science, University of Singapore, 1975), p. 13; Hari Singh, 
“Malaysia and the Communist World, 1968-81” (Ph.D. Dissertation, La Trobe University, Australia, 
1988). 
6
 David Shambaugh, “Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations,” in Thomas W. Robinson 
and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 
pp. 197-223; Harold P. Ford, “Calling the Sino-Soviet Split,” Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998-
1999), pp. 57-71. 
7
 Ilpyong J. Kim, ed., The Strategic Triangle (New York: Paragon House, 1987).  
8
 Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995, p. 88; Robert J. McMahon, The 
Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999). 
9
 Zain Azraai, “Neutralization and Southeast Asia,” in Lau, New Directions in the International 
Relations of Southeast Asia, p. 131. 
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winging its way out of Asia”10, the smaller countries like Malaysia realized that they 
now had to “prepare themselves to face the consequences of firstly, a disengaged U.S. 
in the region and secondly, a communist victory in Vietnam, which was bound to 
have major implications for regional security.”11    
 This called for major adjustments in the smaller states‟ external policies. 
Different states, however, chose to make different adjustments, mainly due to the 
vagaries of their own domestic politics as well as their differing expectations and 
preference for the role of great powers in regional affairs.  
 
 
A Shift to Regional Neutralization  
In Malaysia, the changing structural conditions had compelled the ruling 
Alliance elites – now under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak – to abandon the 
country‟s long-standing pro-West stance, and to replace it with a posture of non-
alignment and regional neutralization (that was first enunciated by Tun Dr Ismail in 
1968). This shift of policy was formalized in April 1970 when Ghazali Shafie, the 
foreign ministry‟s permanent secretary called for the endorsement of the 
neutralization “not only of Indo-China area but of the entire region of South East 
Asia, guaranteed by the three major powers, the People‟s Republic of China, the 
Soviet Union and the United States, against any form of external interference, threat 
or pressure.”12 This call was reiterated in September by Tun Razak on the eve of his 
assumption of premiership, when he presented the idea of “neutralization of Southeast 
Asia” as a key element of Malaysian foreign policy at the Non-Aligned Summit 
Conference in Lusaka.     
 One might wonder: why the Razak government had opted for the idea of 
“regional neutralization”, and not other arrangements like a regional collective 
security pact. A 1972 speech made by Zain Azraai, the then principal private secretary 
to Tun Razak, offers an explanation as to why Malaysian policy elites had cast doubts 
on the effectiveness and suitability of other alternative arrangements:   
Various suggestions for a new framework have been made from time to time. These 
range from the creation of a balance of power, with or without American support, to 
the strengthening of internal order, the pursuit of a more adroit diplomacy, and the 
development of greater military self-reliance. A balance of power with American off-
shore air power, which is what the Nixon Doctrine may eventually evolve into, is 
unlikely to be effective in assisting the countries to defend their territorial integrity 
because air power cannot stop or prevent subversion much less ensure victory, as the 
war in Vietnam illustrates. A purely Asian balance of power, if meant to counter-
balance the emerging power of China or other major powers, is unlikely to prove 
                                                 
10
 Noordin Sopiee, “Towards a „Neutral‟ Southeast Asia,” in Hedley Bull, ed., Asia and the Western 
Pacific: Towards a New International Order (Sydney: Nelson, 1975), pp. 132-58. 
11
 Abdul Razak Baginda, “Malaysian Perceptions of China: From Hostility to Cordiality,” in Herbert 
Yee and Ian Storey, eds., The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 234. 
12
 Ghazali Shafie, Statement to the Preparatory Non-Aligned Conference at Dar-es-Salam on 15 April 
1970; later published in Ghazali, Malaysia: International Relations, p. 157. Elsewhere, Ghazali makes 
a distinction between “neutralization” and “neutrality”. Neutrality refers to “a declaration of non-
involvement by a state” and “pertains to the rules a neutral country should follow in time of war”; 
whereas neutralization refers to “the act which brings about a state of neutralism, and neutralism refers 
to the foreign policy of a state, either alone or in concert with other states, in times of peace.” 
Specifically, neutralism is “a policy of non-alignment with the two power blocs in the Cold War.” See 
his “Neutralisation of Southeast Asia,” Pacific Community (October 1971).      
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credible, even if it could be constituted. An Asian collective security pact has also 
been mooted. Although there is no certainty about the details, it is surely not likely to 
succeed if the intention is to contain or check the legitimate interests of any one of the 
big powers in Southeast Asia. Finally, the strengthening of internal order, the pursuit 
of a more adroit diplomacy, or the development of greater military self-reliance 
cannot be regarded as alternatives because they are in any event essential and indeed 
they are necessary concomitants of neutralization.
13
  
 
For the policy elites in Kuala Lumpur, the idea of regional neutralization 
provided a more viable strategic option to safeguard the interests of smaller states like 
Malaysia in a fluid external environment. Through the three provisions of the idea – 
signing nonaggression treaty among the Southeast Asian states, declaring a policy of 
coexistence, and obtaining a guarantee of Southeast Asian neutralization by the three 
big powers (i.e. the U.S., the USSR, and China) – regional neutralization was viewed 
as an optimal approach to protect Malaysia‟s territorial integrity and sovereignty amid 
an uncertain future.
14
 Specifically, while the first two provisions were aimed at 
promoting regional cooperation and freezing the status quo within Southeast Asia, the 
third element was hoped to reduce the risks of interference by external powers.
15
  
The Malaysian elites reckoned that, in the light of an uncertain power structure 
and an increased communist influence, the bottom line strategies for smaller states 
would be to influence the big powers “to re-define their role” and to set up “clear 
ground rules” for inter-great power interactions, as a way “to insulate the countries of 
Southeast Asia from being a theatre in which the big powers manoeuvre for a 
preponderance of interest and influence”, and thus to insure a degree of peace and 
stability in the region.
16
 In their view, in order to get the great powers to “recognize, 
undertake, and guarantee Southeast Asia as an area of neutrality”, the smaller states in 
the region should acknowledge and accommodate each of the big powers‟ “legitimate 
interests”, while observing a policy of “equidistance” with all the powers.17 
Malaysia‟s stance was strategically logical. As observed by Morrison and Suhrke, 
neutralization “provided a framework within which Malaysia could orient its relations 
with the great powers on the basis of evenhandedness. Unlike most other Southeast 
Asian countries, Malaysia had no close ties to any of the great powers.”18  
 
 
Rapprochement with China 
This new external orientation necessitated Malaysia to adjust its China policy 
because neutralization “required formal relations between the neutralized and the 
guarantor.”19 Tun Ismail – now the Deputy Prime Minister of the Razak government – 
said it plainly: “We cannot ask Communist China to guarantee the neutrality of 
Southeast Asia and at the same time say we do not approve of her.”20 That China had 
now shown a more sober and moderate external posture – as indicated by Beijing‟s 
                                                 
13
 Zain, “Neutralization and Southeast Asia,” p. 134. 
14
 Ghazali, “Neutralisation of Southeast Asia”.  
15
 Morrison and Suhrke, Strategies of Survival, p. 156; Murugesu Pathmanathan, Conflict Management 
in Southeast Asia: A Neutralized Malaysia? Occasional Papers on Malaysian Socio-Economic Affairs 
No. 7 (Kuala Lumpur: Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, 1977).    
16
 Zain, “Neutralization and Southeast Asia,” pp. 129-36. 
17
 Ghazali, “Neutralisation of Southeast Asia”. 
18
 Morrison and Suhrke, Strategies of Survival, p. 159. 
19
 Noordin, “Towards a „Neutral‟ Southeast Asia.”  
20
 Quoted in Morrison and Suhrke, Strategies of Survival, p. 160. 
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move to send its ambassadors who were recalled at the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution back to their posts, as well as its consent to reconvene the Warsaw talks 
with the U.S. – made it easier for Malaysia to explore reconciliation with the giant 
neighbor.  
The first clear sign of Kuala Lumpur‟s changing policy towards Beijing was 
discernable on January 1971, when Razak openly expressed Malaysia‟s desire for a 
rapprochement with the PRC, and urged the latter for a response to his overtures: 
“Malaysia … accepts the fact that China has a right to play her part in the 
international forums and to have interest in the affairs of Asia … But we cannot 
accept or tolerate any form of interference in our internal affairs … (We) await to see 
China‟s response, whether she for her part recognizes and respects our independence 
and integrity and our legitimate interests in South-East Asia.”21 Four months later, in 
part because of the goal of creating direct trading relations with China, and in part 
because of the need to establish some form of communication line with the Chinese 
side in the absence of official links, an officially-sanctioned trade mission was 
dispatched to Beijing. There, the head and key members of the mission were given a 
private audience with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai.         
Subsequently, the shift in Malaysia‟s China‟s policy became even clearer. This 
was perhaps best reflected by the reversal of its stance on the PRC‟s admission to UN. 
In October 1971, Malaysia voted in favor of the Albanian resolution, which called for 
the PRC‟s membership and the expulsion of the Republic of China from the world 
body. Soon after the vote, Malaysia began to initiate contacts to engage China, with 
an eye for normalization.
22
 These contacts paved the way for a series of dialogues and 
negotiations between the two countries‟ representatives in New York, which, in turn, 
led to Razak‟s historic visit to China and the joint communiqué announcing the 
establishment of diplomatic relations in May 1974. Zakaria Ali, the then Malaysian 
Permanent Representative to the UN who conducted negotiations with his Chinese 
counterpart Huang Hua during the 1973-1974 period, recalls in a 2006 article that 
normalization with China “was a bold and courageous step, given the prevailing 
uncertainty, suspicion and mistrust borne out of a perceived communist threat.”23      
The turnabout in Malaysia‟s China policy was not only induced by structural 
pressures, but also motivated by the ruling elites‟ desire to promote their security, 
political, and economic interests. In terms of security, the Malaysian elites calculated 
that, given the pending departure of their Western patrons, establishing relations with 
Beijing was an imperative move to reduce or neutralize the threat of the MCP 
guerillas, who were now restricted mainly to the Malaysia-Thailand border. 
According to journalist Harish Chantola, the Malaysian government “has absolutely 
no confidence that after Indo-China, Thailand will try to resist the mounting pressure 
of communist insurgency and suspects that Thailand might make a compromise with 
them. The next country to face the problem of communist hostility will be, it feels, 
Malaysia. It, therefore, calculates that if Malaysia establishes relations with China, 
                                                 
21
 Prime Minister‟s remarks at the annual meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Singapore, 
1971. In Foreign Affairs Malaysia 4:1 (March 1971), pp. 14-5. 
22
 The initial contact took place in late October 1971, when three Malaysian officials who were sent to 
“accompany” the country‟s table tennis team to China were invited to a “surprise” meeting with 
China‟s Acting Foreign Minister. This was followed by a large trade delegation to the Canton Spring 
Fair in April 1972, during which Razak‟s advisor Raja Mohar Raja Badiozaman was secretly arranged 
to meet with Zhou Enlai. See Chandran, Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy, pp. 106-7.  
23
 Zakaria Mohd Ali, “Normalisation of Relations with China,” in Fauziah Mohamad Taib, ed., Number 
One Wisma Putra (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2006), p. 120. 
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then China might not be in a hurry to activate the Malaysian communist fighters and 
its support to them might not be overt, which it is bound to be if there are no 
diplomatic relations between the two countries.”24 This observation is echoed by 
Malaysian veteran diplomat Zakaria Ali, who notes that normalization was a desirable 
and logical option in order to severe the line of support “given by the PRC, certainly 
by the Chinese Communist Party, to the MCP.”25      
This security imperative was further reinforced by the prevailing domestic 
political calculations in the wake of the ruling Alliance coalition‟s unprecedented 
electoral setback in May 1969, as well as the grave communal riots (between the two 
major ethnic groups, the Malays and Chinese) that followed. The electoral outcomes 
and the racial riots were seen as a clear indicator that UMNO was losing legitimacy 
from its core Malay constituency. In order to reestablish its political authority and to 
restore internal stability, the new leadership in the UMNO-led coalition government 
was in need of formulating new directions for the country.   
Internally, the new government sought to reclaim its political legitimacy 
among its traditional Malay constituency by introducing the pro-Malay affirmative 
action program in the form of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971. The policy 
set out to reduce poverty, to restructure Malaysian society, and to assure inter-ethnic 
peace, chiefly by ensuring that the Bumiputeras
26
 gained privileged access to 
education, to scholarship, to employment in public sector, and to corporate wealth (by 
setting the holdings of corporate assets by the Malays to 30 percent by 1990).
27
 In 
addition, Razak government also moved to consolidate UMNO‟s dominance within 
the ruling coalition by co-opting most opposition parties, thereby transforming the 
Alliance into the enlarged Barisan Nasional (BN, the National Front) in 1973.
28
 These 
political changes dramatically limited the role of the non-Malays‟ (especially the 
Chinese) in Malaysia‟s political and economic life.29 In order to balance the situation 
and allay the fears of the Chinese voters, Razak decided that “a move towards 
rapprochement with China would help to pacify the ethnic Chinese.”30 
Hence, externally, the Razak government decisively redirected the country‟s 
foreign policy posture towards non-alignment and neutralization, as mentioned. This 
move served to appeal not only to Malay nationalists and leftist groups. Given that 
neutralization required the government to drop its earlier anti-Chinese stance and 
make overtures to Beijing, the new posture had the effect of alleviating the alienation 
of ethnic Chinese, winning over their support for the Razak government, and 
                                                 
24
 Harish Chandola, “Changes in Foreign Policy,” Economic and Political Weekly, December 12, 1970, 
p. 1996.  
25
 Zakaria, “Normalisation of Relations with China,” pp. 124-5. 
26
 The term literally means “sons of the soil.” In practice, it is applied principally to the Malays, but 
also the indigenous people in Sabah and Sarawak. 
27
 Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1991), pp. 23-7. 
28
 Scholars like Chee and Crouch see this as a watershed event in Malaysian politics, which marked the 
end of the consociational model that had served as the foundation of inter-communal compromises and 
domestic political order in the multi-ethnic country for the past two decades. See Stephen Chee, 
“Consociational Political Leadership and Conflict Regulation in Malaysia,” in Stephen Chee, ed., 
Leadership and Security in South East Asia: Institutional Aspects (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1991), pp. 53-86; and Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 20-7. 
29
 Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, pp. 19-32; James V. Jesudason, Ethnicity and 
the Economy: The State, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1989).   
30
 Razak Baginda, “Malaysian Perceptions of China,” p. 235. 
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improving inter-ethnic reconciliation in the post-riot environment. As observed by 
Saravanamuttu, the vast majority of local Chinese saw the rapprochement as the 
willingness on the part of a Malay-dominated government to acknowledge their 
ancestral home. In addition, with the resolution of the nationality issue for the 
200,000-odd stateless Chinese in Malaysia, the rapprochement also helped to clarify 
the community‟s status and situation in the country. It was for these reasons that the 
ethnic Chinese “could now look more favourably and confidently on the Razak 
Government coming into power in the aftermath of the traumatic May 13 riots.”31 
Shafruddin Hashim adds that the rapprochement with China served to promote inter-
communal conciliation, chiefly by enabling the Malays “to view the PRC, 
communism, and the local Chinese as separate entities.”32 In the general elections that 
were held little more than two months after Razak‟s China visit, the BN coalition won 
an overwhelming victory. This significantly boosted the government‟s authority.    
Economic considerations also played an important part in driving Razak‟s 
decision to pursue regional neutralization and to normalize Malaysia‟s relations with 
China. Heiner Hanggi suggests that the Malaysian government‟s move was driven by 
“an urgent need for a peaceful environment that would enable the country to 
concentrate on national development especially in the economic field. Furthermore, it 
was hoped that regional neutralization would reduce the defence burden hitherto 
borne by the British and thus avoid the emergence of a „guns-versus-butter‟ 
dilemma.”33 These economic needs were reinforced by the government‟s desire to 
increase and diversify Malaysia‟s commercial links beyond the major industrialized 
countries. Being one of the largest rubber producing countries in the world, Malaysia 
was particularly keen in capturing the potentially huge rubber market in China. 
Driven in part by these economic incentives, a trade delegation was sent to Beijing as 
early as May 1971 to establish direct trade links with China, as noted. The 19-person 
delegation was led by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, chairman of Perbadanan Nasional 
Berhad (PERNAS), a newly-created national trading company designed to promote 
Malay entrepreneurship. Three months later, China sent a trade mission to Malaysia, 
which resulted in a purchase of 40,000 tonnes of rubber, doubling the amount of the 
preceding years.
34
  
Malaysia‟s shifting China policy and its keenness to push for the regional 
neutralization initiative was greeted with caution by its ASEAN partners, including 
Singapore. This became apparent when Malaysia embarked on a diplomatic bid in 
1970-1971 to obtain regional support for its neutralization proposal. The response 
from the ASEAN countries was skeptical at best. Indonesia‟s Adam Malik, for 
instance, expressed his reservations in September 1971: “it seems to me still a rather 
distant possibility to ever get the four major powers, given their divergent interests 
and designs toward the area, voluntarily to agree to its neutralization.”35 Singapore 
held a similar view. At the ASEAN Conference of Foreign Ministers in Kuala 
                                                 
31
 J. Saravanamuttu, “Malaysia-China Ties, Pre and Post 1974: An Overview,” in Loh Kok Wah, Phang 
Chung Nyap, and J. Saravanamuttu, The Chinese Community and Malaysia-China Ties: Elite 
Perspectives (Tokyo: The Institute of Developing Economies, 1981), p. 29.  
32
 Shafruddin Hashim, “Malaysian Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Impact of Ethnicity,” in 
Karl D. Jackson, Sukhumbhand Paribatra, and J. Soedjati Djiwandono, eds., ASEAN in Regional and 
Global Context (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986), p. 159.  
33
 Heiner Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept, Pacific Strategic Papers No. 4 (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 1991), p. 13. 
34
 Xia Ming, “Sino-Malaysian Trade Ties and Its Prospects,” Economic Quarterly (April 1990), p. 22. 
 
35
 Quoted in Dick Wilson, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 53.  
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Lumpur in November 1971, its representative submitted an elaborate paper 
questioning the feasibility of the Malaysian proposal.
36
 In 1973, Lee Kuan Yew said it 
rather bluntly that “it was a fact of life both for the present and for the near future that 
big power guarantees would not be forthcoming.”37  
According to Dick Wilson, Singapore was probably aware that Malaysia‟s 
proposal might have to do with the China factor. He quotes an editorial in The New 
Nation that was published in Singapore just before the Kuala Lumpur conference:  
 
Malaysia‟s strategy seems to be to offer a bait to China‟s regional neutralization – 
which, its officials have now admitted, implies the eventual abrogation of the 
Commonwealth five-power defense agreement and will also presumably mean an end 
to SEATO and the American bases in both Thailand and the Philippines. „If you live 
up to the U.N. charter,‟ the ASEAN line to Peking could be, „and stop this overt 
interference in our affairs, then we will gradually disengage from our Western 
military entanglements. But we must do it in step, and we want to see something from 
your side, some evidence of change in your patronage of our local Communist 
minorities, before we take the risk of sending our Western friends home.‟ If this is a 
correct interpretation of Tun Razak‟s proposal, then it seems on the face of it to be a 
good strategy. It would put the ball in Peking‟s court.38     
 
 
Phase II (1976-1989): 
 
Anchoring on ASEAN and Keeping Links with the West,  
While Adopting Economic Pragmatism towards China 
Regional security in Southeast Asia entered a new phase in the mid-1970s. 
After the stunning victories of the Soviet-backed communist troops in Phnom Penh 
and Saigon by April 1975, the ASEAN states now found themselves directly exposed 
to the risks of revolutionary forces from the north. By July 1976, the U.S. had 
withdrawn all its forces from Thailand. These developments altered the balance of 
power between the Moscow-backed Hanoi and the non-communist regional states, 
and aroused concerns about America‟s will to come to the defense of ASEAN 
countries should they face external aggression. In addition, they also intensified the 
Sino-Soviet rivalry as they vied to fill the power vacuum in Indochina.
39
 All these 
took place at a time when Australia and Britain had just pulled out their remaining 
troops from Singapore. These events combined to create a grave uncertainty in the 
external environment of the smaller countries. 
 Such structural changes brought tremendous pressures on Malaysia and its 
ASEAN partners, forcing them to rethink their external relations. Realizing that they 
now shared a common destiny in the face of a growing communist threat from the 
north, the smaller states had begun to anchor on ASEAN as a platform to converge and 
coordinate their diplomatic efforts, while working to keep their ties with the U.S. and 
other dialogue partners as a source to strengthen their strategic position vis-à-vis the 
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communist powers.  
 
 
ASEAN as the Cornerstone of External Policy  
In response to the deteriorating situation in Indochina, the leaders of the 
ASEAN states met in Bali, Indonesia in February 1976. This historic meeting – the 
first ever summit since the inception of the regional body a decade earlier – produced 
a number of key documents that set the direction for ASEAN‟s future development. 
These included a Declaration of ASEAN Concord, a Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), and an agreement to set up a permanent 
secretariat in Jakarta. These documents were important in that, in addition to holding 
out an olive branch to Vietnam by expressing ASEAN‟s willingness for peaceful 
coexistence, they also spelt out the principles of conduct governing inter-state 
relations for the promotion of “collective political security” in the region.40  
With the adoption of these core documents, the role of ASEAN had effectively 
moved from one of seeking regional reconciliation in the aftermath of Konfrontasi, to 
one of building “regional resilience” through closer political and economic 
cooperation among the non-communist countries, as a way to safeguard them from 
the growing communist threat.
41
 The term “regional resilience” was extended from 
the concept “national resilience” (as coined by Indonesian elites), which stresses on 
the importance of state-led economic development as the “first line of defense” 
against internal subversion and external aggression.
42
 These internal efforts were seen 
as a foundation, and indeed, the sine qua non for regional collaboration under the 
framework of ASEAN, which, by way of enabling the regional countries to avoid 
intra-mural conflict and focus on developing their own economy, was in turn expected 
to beef up the individual governments‟ capacity to rule.43  
 
 
Retaining the U.S. Strategic Presence  
Besides making these internal and regional endeavors, the leaders of the 
ASEAN countries – particularly Singapore but also other regional states – also took 
steps to retain the continuing regional role of the U.S., whom they viewed as best 
serving their interests in balance of power terms.
44
 As noted by Chin Kin Wah, even 
though some ASEAN countries “may be less disposed to express their interests in an 
American military presence in the region, all of them are favorably inclined towards 
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an American underpinning of their political and economic viability.”45 Despite the 
Vietnam debacle, ASEAN states had continued to see Washington as an indispensable 
actor in upholding regional order and assisting them to complement, augment, and 
strengthen their position to deal with the outside world.
46
  
While Malaysia and Singapore‟s security position was augmented to some 
extent by the existence of the FPDA, the leaders of the two states knew full well that 
the efficacy of such arrangement was subject to the U.S. role. As observed by Obaid 
Ul Haq, “The value of the Five Power Defence arrangements lay primarily in its 
psychological import. By the late 1970s even this psychological value was seen as a 
function of the overall American policy and interests in South-East Asia. In 1978 Lee 
Kuan Yew said, „Whether it [FPDA] will continue to have any relevance depends not 
simply on Australia and New Zealand, but on the US, her policies and postures in the 
Pacific and Indian Ocean. … As long as the US is seen clearly to be a force in the 
region, these residual token forces are not irrelevant as tokens.‟”47  
Despite the fact that the Carter administration (1976-1980)‟s new foreign 
policy agenda in championing human rights, in placing more emphasis on Africa than 
on Asia, and in planning to withdraw troops from South Korea had agitated 
Washington‟s Asian partners who became more concerned about the possibility of 
American retreat from the region, Singapore and other Southeast Asian leaders had 
continued to advocate for a sustained American presence in the region.
48
  
Beyond individual countries‟ diplomatic endeavors, the effort to retain the 
U.S.‟ involvement was also made at the regional level.49 In 1977, the U.S. became 
ASEAN‟s dialogue partner, along with Japan, Canada, and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). ASEAN‟s other dialogue partners were: the 
European Economic Community (since 1972), Australia (1974), and New Zealand 
(1975).
50
 In 1978, ASEAN‟s consultation with its partners was institutionalized as the 
Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), a collective forum held after the annual ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) and attended by foreign ministers from all ASEAN 
countries and their dialogue partners.  
The dialogue mechanism was important for both economic and non-economic 
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reasons. It facilitated ASEAN states‟ efforts to obtain more investment opportunity 
and technical assistance from the developed world, while allowing them to discuss 
regional security issues with their non-communist partners on a regular basis.
51
 More 
importantly, the involvement of the extra-mural powers (especially the U.S.) in this 
dialogue mechanism also served to showcase their solidarity with ASEAN and to 
“restore some sort of strategic balance in the region.”52  
 
 
Responding to the Cambodian Conflict 
The need for such a policy reorientation – i.e. giving a greater emphasis on 
ASEAN as the cornerstone of their foreign policy while continuing to look upon the 
U.S. and other dialogue partners as the principal source of external assistance – was 
reinforced in the late 1970s, after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978 and 
after Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan in December 1979. The latter marked 
the breakdown of the superpower détente and the advent of the second Cold War.   
For the elites in the non-communist ASEAN capitals, these events had the 
effect of swinging the gravity of their policy attention back to military security issues. 
The Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, in particular, put an end to 
ASEAN states‟ hope for peaceful coexistence with communist Indochina.53 Hanoi‟s 
act was seen as a blatant violation of the sanctity of national sovereignty as stressed in 
the TAC.
54
 According to Michael Leifer, the ASEAN states could not afford to 
endorse such a violation because doing so “would have indicated tolerance for a 
precedent with disturbing implications for the security of all member states.”55 They 
saw the risks of greater regional instability if the present conflict spilled into the 
neighboring areas.
56
  
The non-communist states were thus forced to oppose the Soviet-backed 
Vietnamese aggression openly. They rallied behind ASEAN and began to act as a 
“diplomatic community”; while at the same time closing ranks with their Western 
partners in what was later called the Third Indochina War.
57
 Largely due to the 
activism of Thailand (a frontline state because of its proximity to Cambodia) and 
Singapore (who was always concerned about the danger of aggression by a larger 
neighbor), the ASEAN states mounted a collective diplomatic campaign to deny 
international recognition to the Hanoi-installed regime in Phnom Penh, and demanded 
the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the restoration of Cambodian sovereignty.
58
     
These diplomatic efforts were augmented by a strategic endeavor of working 
with the Western powers, particularly the U.S., who, out of its need to curb Soviet 
expansion after Afghanistan, had “rediscovered” the strategic significance of 
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Southeast Asia.
59
 The U.S. increasingly saw ASEAN as a “potent diplomatic 
coalition” that was instrumental in handling the Cambodian crisis.60  
The congruence of strategic interests between ASEAN and the U.S. in the 
post-1979 milieu thus led to a closer military relationship between the two sides. 
While carefully avoiding any direct military involvement this time around, 
Washington had moved to provide military assistance – in the form of military grants, 
arms supply, and training of military personnel – to the ASEAN states in order to 
build up indigenous military capability. These included not only Thailand and the 
Philippines who remained the formal U.S. allies through the 1954 Manila Pact, but 
also the Malacca Strait littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. On the 
part of the ASEAN countries, they mostly welcomed a firmer American security 
commitment, including its pledge to come to Thailand‟s defense in the event of 
Vietnamese invasion. They also viewed the U.S. presence in the Subic Bay and Clark 
Air Force bases in the Philippines as serving the functions of deterrence and 
preserving the balance of power in the region. This positive assessment was 
subsequently reinforced by the U.S. ability to accept and accelerate the intake of the 
“boat people” – hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese refugees (predominantly ethnic 
Chinese) who fled the communist takeover – from the overcrowded camps in the 
ASEAN countries.   
Consequently, for the period 1979-1989, as the Cambodian conflict continued 
to drag on, the ASEAN states had, on the whole, become more aligned with and more 
dependent on the U.S. for their external security.
61
 In the case of Malaysia, although 
its leaders at the formal level still stressed on regional neutralization and equidistance 
with the big powers, the expansion of Vietnamese and Soviet influence as well as the 
intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry in Indochina had compelled Kuala Lumpur to 
follow the American lead on security issues.
62
  
It must be noted that the closer ASEAN-U.S. ties since the late 1970s were not 
merely a result of their overlapping security interests, but also a product of growing 
economic intimacy. In part because of the growing trade volume between the two 
sides, and in part because of the ASEAN states‟ ongoing efforts to expand and 
diversify their economic structure, the smaller states‟ economic performance had 
become more and more tied up with that of the U.S. and other developed countries, 
who remained the major source of capital and technology to the ASEAN region.
63
 
Singapore‟s efforts since the mid-1970s to develop its service sector in the areas of 
international finance, tourism, transport and other services, for instance, had the effect 
of increasing the economic importance of the U.S. to the city-state. Similarly, the 
Malaysian government‟s export-led industrialization policy since the 1970s – as 
accentuated by the 1971 Free Trade Zone Act that was aimed at attracting foreign 
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direct investment in the country‟s export-oriented manufacturing sector – had resulted 
in a marked increase in the participation of U.S. MNCs in producing electronic and 
semiconductor products for export purposes.
64
 In 1977, the American Business 
Council of Malaysia was established in Kuala Lumpur.  
 
 
Strengthening Economic Links with Japan 
 A similar dynamic also underpinned the ASEAN states‟ ties with other trading 
partners, especially Japan. The Fukuda Doctrine of 1977 – as enunciated by Prime 
Minister Takeo Fukuda during his Southeast Asian tour in August that year – was a 
watershed in ASEAN-Japan relations. By rejecting any military role for itself in 
Southeast Asia, by emphasizing its intent to promote ties based on the principle of 
“heart-to-heart” understanding, and by expressing its commitment to be “an equal 
partner” of ASEAN, the doctrine served to reassure the Southeast Asian leaders who 
until then had perceived Japan in a negative light, largely because of their memory of 
Japanese aggression in the Second World War and their present concerns about 
Japanese “economic over-presence” in Southeast Asia.65 To demonstrate its 
commitment, Japan pledged to increase its financial and technical aid to ASEAN 
countries under its Official Development Assistance (ODA) program. This served as a 
catalyst to forge closer economic cooperation between the two sides.
66
 Despite some 
controversies over the terms of Japanese aid, the ASEAN leaders had in the main 
welcomed Japan‟s increased role, seeing it as a positive factor for their efforts to build 
up national and regional resilience. The ASEAN-Japan economic ties were further 
enhanced after the mid-1980s, following the Plaza Accord of 1985 that caused the 
Japanese yen to appreciate against the U.S. dollar and ASEAN currencies. This 
development, along with the shift in the Japanese manufacturing structure toward 
high-tech production and an increase in the wage rate in the more developed 
economies in Asia, combined to make ASEAN countries an attractive destination for 
investors from Japan as well as the Newly-Industrialized Economies (NIEs).
67
 The 
1980s thus witnessed a boom in Japanese (and NIEs) investment and the relocation of 
Japanese export-oriented industries to the region. The net result was the growth of a 
dense regional production network and the emergence of the so-called “flying geese” 
pattern of industrial development in East Asia.  
Economic ties aside, the ASEAN countries and Japan also forged cooperation 
in political and regional security spheres. Upon the suggestion of Japanese foreign 
minister Sunao Sonoda, the ASEAN-Japan Foreign Ministers‟ Meeting was held in 
June 1978.
68
 The ASEAN-Japan political cooperation was enhanced after Vietnam‟s 
invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. Japan terminated its aid to Hanoi, threw its 
support for ASEAN‟s position on Cambodia, launched a quiet diplomacy to act as an 
intermediary between ASEAN and Vietnam, and endeavored to include the 
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Cambodian issue in the G7 Summit Statement in 1981.
69
 According to Glenn Hook, 
Tokyo also moved to “increase its burden-sharing efforts for US security strategy in 
the region”, by increasing its strategic aid to American allies and countries bordering 
the areas of conflict.
70
  
The convergence of geostrategic and economic interests in the aftermath of 
1979 thus caused the ASEAN states and their extra-mural dialogue partners – 
spearheaded by Washington – to align with each other throughout the second Cold 
War period. This de facto alignment – cemented by their common opposition to the 
Soviet-backed Vietnamese presence in Cambodia and dictated by a growing economic 
congruence among them – constituted the basis of the regional order in Asia Pacific 
for the next decade or so. By the mid-1980s, the U.S. had emerged as both the de 
facto principal security patron and the main economic partner for the ASEAN 
countries, including Malaysia.  
Despite this positive trend, some bilateral irritants did exist between the U.S. 
and individual ASEAN states. In the case of Malaysia-U.S. relations, Kuala Lumpur 
was unhappy about Washington‟s increasing protectionist tendency and its actions 
that resulted in a fall in the price of tin and rubber, which severely affected Malaysia‟s 
source of income. In addition, Malaysia was also disturbed by U.S. growing overtures 
to the PRC, particularly the Reagan administration‟s decision to sell lethal weaponry 
to China, whom Malaysian elites had persistently perceived as the largest long-term 
threat to Malaysia and Southeast Asia.
71
 Kuala Lumpur‟s apprehension over 
Washington‟s growing military ties with Beijing was also shared by Indonesia, and to 
some extent, Singapore. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew remarked: “a well-armed 
China may become a greater problem for South-East Asia.”72  
Significantly, in addition to worrying about the longer-term ramifications of 
the emerging U.S.-China alignment as well as the uncertainty surrounding the U.S.‟ 
commitment to their security, the smaller countries in the region also feared that their 
closer strategic cooperation with the U.S. might invite negative responses from the 
Soviet camp. As noted by Chandran Jeshurun, while the ASEAN states had to 
different degrees desired an American role in the preservation of Southeast Asian 
security, they were nonetheless concerned about “the manner in which the United 
States could fulfill such a role without appearing to be obstructive and thus attracting 
a negative response from both the Indochina states as well as the Soviet Union.”73 
This observation was echoed by Hari Singh: 
 
“Although Malaysia had sought to offset the disequilibrium in power by seeking 
closer security ties with the other pole of superpower, the American decision to 
invoke the „China card‟ in the strategic triangle forced Malaysia into an informal 
alignment with China. Ironically, this aggravated Malaysia‟s security dilemma. First, 
partiality in the Sino-Soviet conflict invited Soviet retaliation in Malaysian domestic 
politics, the possibility being that Moscow would aid a splinter group of the 
Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). Second, the prospects of Vietnam‟s collapse 
under US-China-ASEAN pressure would have meant unfettered Chinese influence in 
Southeast Asia. Finally, the possibility of the Soviet Union invoking its treaty 
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commitments to Vietnam had the potential of a great power war being fought in 
Southeast Asia.”
74
   
 
 
The Problem of Uncertainty and the Need to Diversify Strategic Links 
Malaysia and Singapore‟s concerns over the drawback of aligning too closely 
with the U.S., as noted above, reflect a recurring strategic dilemma facing all smaller 
states. As the Lilliputians constantly sandwiched between competing giants, smaller 
actors tend to be acutely aware of the possible consequences of the uncertainties at 
the structural level – i.e. how the capricious nature of the big powers’ commitment as 
well as the changeability in the distribution of capabilities among the giants might 
have an adverse impact on their own survival. Given that no one could be sure of how 
the big powers‟ relations might evolve in the future, the smaller states know that they 
cannot afford to completely antagonize any of the big powers, especially those who 
are in the position of hurting them if they wanted to. Besides, there is also a deep-
seated fear that they might be unnecessarily drawn into a big-power war. 
It was largely due to such high-uncertainties and high-stakes that although the 
ASEAN states had all continued to align with Western countries throughout the 
second Cold War period, they had also conspicuously avoided placing all their bets 
on one single option. Instead of completely taking side with one power, the smaller 
actors had carefully moved to cultivate a degree of independence by seeking some 
form of détente with the communist powers.  
Malaysia, for instance, in the wake of Western military disengagement from 
Southeast Asia, had sought to explore and establish closer working relationships with 
the communist powers. After normalizing its ties with the Soviet Union in November 
1967, the Malaysian government ventured to establish diplomatic relations with 
Vietnam and China in March 1973 and May 1974, respectively. Although Kuala 
Lumpur‟s effort to attain détente with the communist world began to lose steam in the 
latter half of the 1970s largely as a result of the developments in Indochina, Malaysia 
continued to accommodate and maintain some form of “correct relations” with each 
of these communist powers throughout this period.
75
 
Malaysia‟s relations with the communist powers, however, were structurally 
limited by the underlying ideological divisions and political distrust. Malaysian-
Soviet relations were badly affected not only by Moscow‟s invasion of Afghanistan 
that angered Malaysia‟s Muslim population, but also by two exposes of KGB-related 
espionage activities in 1976 and 1981. According to Malaysian scholar K.S. Nathan, 
these incidents strengthened the Malaysian government‟s view that “Communist 
embassies should be under close surveillance, and that contacts between their 
personnel and the Malaysian populace should be discouraged as far as possible.”76 
The Malaysian-Vietnamese relations were similarly constrained by a clear divergence 
in their political and security interests. Hanoi‟s invasion of Cambodia and the 
dramatic influx of Vietnamese refugees into Malaysia in 1978 made Vietnam an 
immediate policy focus for elites in Kuala Lumpur. The invasion not only reinforced 
Malaysian leaders‟ perceptions of the Vietnamese threat, but also deepened their 
concern about the escalating risks of the Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Soviet conflicts. 
Malaysia‟s relations with Communist China, in comparison, were more 
intricate. Throughout the period 1976-1989, the bilateral relations had remained 
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ambivalent. While the growing desire on the part of the smaller states to tap into 
China‟s market – after the latter‟s reform policy since 1978 and after the global 
economic recession in the mid-1980s – had increasingly driven Malaysia to develop 
its economic cooperation with China, the smaller state‟s political ties with the giant 
had remained cool well into the late 1980s. It is to this aspect that I now turn.   
 
 
Malaysia’s China Policy after the Rapprochement:  
Between Lingering Political Distrust and Growing Economic Pragmatism 
1976 was an eventful year for Malaysia. The dramatic shift in external 
environment coincided with a change in the country‟s leadership, when Prime 
Minister Tun Razak who died of leukemia in January 1976 was succeeded by his 
deputy Hussein Onn. Under Tun Hussein‟s tenure from 1976 to 1981, Malaysia‟s 
China policy was marked by an ambivalent mixture of lingering political distrust and 
growing economic imperative. This pattern persisted into the early years of Dr 
Mahathir Mohamad‟s premiership, who replaced Tun Hussein in July 1981 when the 
latter stepped down for health reasons. While Mahathir‟s 1985 visit to China had the 
effect of deepening the dynamics of economic pragmatism, it did not remove 
Malaysia‟s distrust of Beijing, which lingered on throughout the final decade of the 
Cold War.  
Despite the rapprochement with China in 1974, Malaysian leaders from Razak 
to Hussein had continued to view Beijing with distrust and apprehension. They were 
upset over China‟s continuing ties with the banned Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP), which sought to overthrow the BN government by force. Leaders in Kuala 
Lumpur repeatedly protested over China sending fraternal greetings to MCP, and 
vehemently objected to Beijing‟s dual-track policy of separating government-to-
government relations and party-to-party ties (which meant the relationship between 
the Chinese Communist Party and the communist parties elsewhere were separate 
from government-to-government relationship).
77
 Joseph Liow observes that while 
Chinese leaders attempted to placate the concerns of Malaysian leaders by reiterating 
that their support of the MCP was necessary in order to prevent Soviet influence being 
exerted on the party and that the support was limited only to moral support, the latter 
remained unconvinced.
78
 In addition, the leaders were also concerned about Beijing‟s 
policy of treating the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia as “returned Overseas Chinese.”   
Largely due to these problems, Malaysian leaders had remained wary of 
China‟s intentions. The visit by Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping (who had just 
emerged as China‟s paramount leader after the death of Mao and the purge of the 
Gang of Four) to Malaysia in November 1978 as well as Tun Hussein‟s trip to China 
in May 1979 did not alter this. In fact, Beijing‟s large-scale “punitive” war against 
Vietnam in February-March 1979 further convinced Malaysian policymakers of 
China inclination to use force in solving inter-state problems. They thus perceived 
China rather than Vietnam as the greater threat to Southeast Asia. According to one 
observer, the media event staged in January 1981 on the occasion of the return of 
Musa Ahmad, the former chairman of the MCP, in which he openly condemned 
China‟s role in supporting the movement, clearly demonstrated that the Malaysian 
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government “was not reluctant to seize the opportunity to reassert its conviction that 
the PRC constitutes a long-term threat to Malaysia.”79  
Indeed, Malaysia‟s apprehension about China‟s long-term ambitious was 
earlier evidenced by a statement jointly issued by Premier Hussein and Indonesian 
President Suharto at a bilateral meeting in the Malaysian east coast town of Kuantan 
in March 1980. In what was later known as the Kuantan Doctrine or Kuantan 
Principle, the two countries declared that Vietnam must be freed from the influence of 
both China and the Soviet Union. Amitav Acharya observes that the doctrine 
highlighted “an intra-ASEAN divide” over the Indochina conflict, with Malaysia and 
Indonesia on one side holding the view that “China posed the real long-term threat to 
Southeast Asia, and that Vietnam could be a bulwark against Chinese expansionism”, 
and Singapore and Thailand, on the other side, insisting that the Soviet-backed 
Vietnam was the main threat to regional peace and security.
80
  
These political and security apprehensions notwithstanding, Malaysia‟s policy 
towards China during this period was also driven by a growing desire on the part of 
the BN government to gain economic benefits from China. This was evidenced by an 
8-day economic mission led by the then Malaysian primary commodities minister 
Musa Hitam to China in October 1976. The mission resulted in China‟s agreement to 
purchase 5,000 tons of palm oil from Malaysia, which marked the first consignment 
of the commodity between the two countries.
81
 It also brought home China‟s 
assurance to increase its purchase of natural rubber and timber from Malaysia, as well 
as a pledge to refrain from taking action that might adversely affect the price of tin in 
the international market (of which Malaysia was the main exporter).
82
   
China‟s economic reform and open-door policy in 1978 added further 
momentum to Malaysia‟s economic pragmatism. Developing closer bilateral 
economic cooperation was clearly one of the major goals underlying Tun Hussein‟s 
1979 visit to China. During his trip, the premier remarked: “Trade and economic ties 
have always been and should continue to be the strongest basis for the development 
and strengthening of bilateral relations between the two countries. We should 
therefore make further endeavor to extent our trade ties. As China moves ahead with 
her modernization programs, and as Malaysia increases the pace of her 
industrialization and production of primary products, there will be increasing 
opportunities for this expansion.”83 
Economic rationale continued to guide Malaysia‟s China policy after Mahathir 
took over the country‟s reign in 1981. While the new premier had clearly placed more 
emphasis on strengthening the country‟s economic ties with Japan under his Look 
East Policy,
84
 he had also sought to develop closer economic ties with other big 
economies such as China, especially after the mid-1980s. Indeed, as shall be made 
clear shortly, it was during the first decade of Mahathir‟s tenure as the country‟s 
fourth premier that economic pragmatism was consolidated and made a central theme 
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in Malaysia-China relations. In part due to the new leader‟s desire to reduce 
Malaysia‟s dependency on the West, and in part due to the prevailing view among 
Malaysian policy elites that Deng‟s economic reform in the post-Mao China was a 
trend that was unlikely to be reversed, the Malaysian government had since the mid-
1980s determined to tap into the potential of the giant neighbor‟s growing market.85 
This determination was reinforced by the mid-1980s world economic recession, 
which exposed Malaysia‟s vulnerabilities as a result of the country‟s heavy 
dependency on the American and European markets. It was against this backdrop that 
Mahathir made a historic visit to China in November 1985.   
Mahathir‟s 1985 visit to China was in many ways a watershed moment for 
Malaysia-China relations. The trip was significant not only because it was Mahathir‟s 
first visit to the country (he subsequently made six more visits during the period 
1993-2001), but more importantly it was also because the trip signaled Mahathir‟s 
pragmatism in concentrating on economic matters as a way to manage what was then 
considered to be the “most sensitive foreign relationship” for Malaysia.86 This top-
down pragmatism cleared bureaucratic hurdles and smoothed the path for the signing 
of a series of important documents that were aimed at facilitating bilateral trade and 
investment. These documents were: the Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement 
(inked during Mahathir‟s 1985 trip), the Maritime Transport Agreement (signed in 
September 1987), the Direct Trade Agreement (April 1988), the Investment 
Guarantee Agreement (November 1988), and the Air Services Agreement (Mac 
1989). In addition, the two governments also agreed in 1988 to establish the Joint 
Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation. These arrangements laid important 
groundwork for subsequent economic cooperation between the two countries. 
Significantly, these arrangements were made in conjunction with several policy 
adjustments on the part of the Malaysian government. These included the 1988 moves 
to abolish the requirement for Approved Permits to import Chinese products and to 
abolish the 5% administrative charge, which were targeted at fostering greater direct 
trade links between the two countries.
87
   
Nevertheless, despite the growing pragmatism to forge closer economic ties, 
political vigilance remained.
88
 Malaysian government‟s suspicions of China‟s 
overseas Chinese policy were confirmed in 1984, when it discovered that Chinese 
Malaysian were allowed to visit China clandestinely with special visas issued by the 
Chinese authority in Hong Kong, and that they were treated like returning overseas 
Chinese and looked after by the Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs in China.
89
 
The overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea between China and 
Malaysia (along with Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan) further added to 
the bilateral mistrust.
90
    
Malaysian leaders‟ lingering suspicions about China were clearly evident in 
                                                 
85
 Author‟s interview with Dato Abdul Majid Ahmad Khan, Puchong, November 4, 2009. Majid served 
as the Political Counselor at the Malaysian Embassy in Beijing during Mahathir‟s historic visit in 1985, 
and subsequently became the Malaysian Ambassador to China from 1998 to 2005. He is currently the 
President of the Malaysia-China Friendship Association.       
86
 See James Clad, “An Affair of the Head,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 4, 1985, pp. 12-4. 
87
 Shee Poon Kim, The Political Economy of Mahathir’s China Policy: Economic Cooperation, 
Political and Strategic Ambivalence, IUJ Research Institute Working Paper 2004-6 (Tokyo: IUJ 
Research Institute, 2004). 
88
 Stephen Leong, “Malaysia and the People‟s Republic of China in the 1980s: Political Vigilance and 
Economic Pragmatism,” Asian Survey 27:10 (October 1987), pp. 1109-26.   
89
 Ibid.   
90
 Ibid. 
Article: Kuik Cheng-Chwee 
 
 Jebat  Volume 37 (2010) Page | 50  
Mahathir‟s speech to students and faculty at Qinghua University during his 1985 visit: 
 
… we welcome the many assurances of your leaders that China will never seek 
hegemony and will never do anything to harm us. We also note your assurances that 
China`s developing military capacity is purely for its own defence. We appreciate the 
enormous burden of self-restraint and responsibility that this entails. I ask that you 
understand us, if despite these assurances, some concerns linger on, for we are 
extremely jealous of our sovereignty and trust does not come easily to us in view of 
our past experiences. Our experiences with China have not entirely been free of 
problems and it would take time and mutual efforts for us to put to rest some of the 
things left over from history.
91
 
 
Because of its lingering distrust of China, the Malaysian government had 
continued to pursue a “managed and controlled” policy throughout the 1980s.92 Under 
this policy, which was designed to insulate the local Chinese from China‟s influence 
and reduce the risk of subversion, all interactions between Malaysia and China were 
subject to certain rules and controls. Not only were all visits to China (personal or 
economic reasons) and all publications from China put under strict security control, 
all economic and trade activities were also tightly monitored.
93
 For instance, 
Malaysian businessmen who wanted to travel to the Canton Trade Fair and participate 
in the trade shows organized by the Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Malaysia or the Kuala Lumpur-Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (but led by PERNAS and the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry) had to seek approval from the Ministry of Interior and be interviewed.
94
 
Although the government eventually relaxed the measures in the late 1980s by lifting 
the restrictions that limited the visits of Malaysian businessmen to the Canton Trade 
Fair and by issuing multiple exit permits that allowed Malaysian traders to longer stay 
in China to facilitate Malaysian firms doing business in the country, deep-seated 
political mistrust continued to characterize the Malaysia-China relations throughout 
the 1980s. It was not until 1989 when the MCP signed a peace agreement with the 
Malaysian government that genuine normalization was reached between Malaysia and 
China.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The discussion above indicates that, the structural pressures in the wake of 
reduced Western commitments since the late 1960s – along with Malaysia‟s domestic 
political development after May 1969 – had pushed the country‟s new leader to 
respond by pushing for regional neutralization and making rapprochement with 
China, which culminated in the establishment of the diplomatic relations in May 
1974. Despite its formal rapprochement with China, however, Kuala Lumpur had 
continued to perceive Beijing as the largest long-term threat, largely due to China‟s 
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continuing support for the outlawed MCP as well as its overseas Chinese policy. 
Consequently, in spite of its desire to gain economic benefits from China‟s growing 
market, the Malaysian government had continued to pursue a “manage and control” 
policy throughout the 1980s, which was aimed at limiting the people-to-people 
interactions between the two countries. This reflected the leaders‟ concerns to strike a 
balance between a lingering political distrust and a growing economic pragmatism 
toward Beijing. 
It can be inferred from the above analysis that Malaysia‟s alignment choice 
during this period was not a case of classic or pure balancing. This is because 
notwithstanding Malaysia and its ASEAN partners‟ efforts to align strategically with 
the Western powers, the smaller states clearly did not place their entire bets in their 
partners. Rather, instead of completely closing ranks with the West and completing 
confronting the Communist power, the smaller states had adopted a counteracting 
move by simultaneously striving to develop a working relationship with the source of 
security concerns, in an apparent attempt to hedge the risk of uncertainty. Such a 
hedging approach has largely persisted into the post-Cold War era. 
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